Tungsten, as a critical mineral for the national defense industry and high - end manufacturing, the global supply chain pattern of tungsten directly affects the strategic security of major powers. Recently, through a combination of "government + enterprise + finance", the United States intends to "cut in line" ahead of China in the bidding for the two core tungsten mine projects, the Upper Kairadjinskoye and the North Katpal in Kazakhstan.

The battle for the world's top untapped tungsten resources embodies the U.S. global strategy for critical minerals to achieve supply chain autonomy, geopolitical balance, and strategic advantage. The U.S. binds resource competition with geopolitics through tungsten mine cooperation to achieve a dual strategic goal of "resources-security". This game involves not only the struggle for control of mineral resources but also the restructuring of the global supply chain and the evolution of the geopolitical pattern.

01 Tungsten's strategic value highlights and leverages the evolution of the global resource pattern

01 Geopolitical conflicts and great power competition intensify the global struggle for tungsten resources

Tungsten, as a rare metal with the highest melting point (3410℃) and extremely strong hardness, is an irreplaceable raw material for high-end manufacturing and defense equipment such as aerospace engines, high-density armor-piercing bullets, and missile propellers. Tungsten belongs to the niche metal market, and the mainstream valuation covering the entire industrial chain is concentrated around $4-5 billion. However, the industries relying on tungsten are growing exponentially. Tungsten has always been considered a critical "war metal" and is listed as a strategic mineral by many countries, especially since the protracted Russia-Ukraine conflict exposed the Western countries' shortcomings in ammunition production capacity, with tungsten being a key raw material highly dependent on foreign supplies, which has become its biggest hidden danger. On the other hand, tungsten has become a key support for the expansion of the clean energy industry, further highlighting its strategic value in the transition to new energy. According to data from the Yangtze River Non-Ferrous Metals Network, the demand for photovoltaic tungsten filaments surged from 20% in 2024 to 60% in 2025, driving the demand to break through 4500 tons, a year-on-year increase of 198%; the demand for lithium tungstate, a core material of solid-state batteries, reached 12,000 tons, a year-on-year increase of 300%.

02 Global tungsten production and supply chain is highly concentrated, exacerbating Western strategic anxiety

At present, the global tungsten resource supply is highly concentrated. In 2024, the global tungsten output was approximately 81,000 tons. China is the core supplier of global tungsten resources and controls the vast majority of downstream processing capacity. In 2025, China further strengthened all - round control over tungsten exports through multiple measures such as issuing special export control announcements and tightening mining quotas. The tungsten concentrate mining quota issued in April 2025 decreased by 6.45% year - on - year. In contrast, the United States stopped tungsten production in 2015. According to the "2025 Mineral Commodity Summaries" of the United States Geological Survey (USGS), its total tungsten import dependence is 50%. Due to differences in statistical calibers, other data from this institution also show figures such as 80% and 83%. From 2020 to 2023, the proportion of imports in the form of ore and concentrates is as follows: 27% from China, 14% from Germany, 8% from Bolivia, 8% from Vietnam, and 43% from other sources. In specific sub - fields, the external dependence of the United States on high - end tungsten products required in fields such as aerospace and military industry is nearly 100%. The highly concentrated supply pattern has prompted the United States to prioritize tungsten resource self - sufficiency as a national strategic priority. The USGS has included tungsten in its list of critical minerals and pointed out that any major disruption in the supply of this metal would have an impact on the US gross domestic product. The US Department of Defense also lists tungsten as a core strategic material, stating that its supply security is directly related to national security.

03 The United States takes multiple measures to accelerate the localization of domestic tungsten production.

To de-risk the supply chain, the Trump administration announced in September 2025 an additional 25% tariff on tungsten products imported from China under Section 301. In May 2025, American Tungsten Corp., a U.S. tungsten industry company, announced the resumption of mining operations at its Idaho Ima tungsten project and on November 7 announced receipt of a $255 million special loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank for the Ima mine. One of the world's largest tungsten miners, Almonty Industries Inc., headquartered in Toronto, announced in July its relocation to the United States, with multiple key mineral projects in Spain, Portugal, and South Korea. Among them, the Sangdong tungsten mine in South Korea has a ore grade three times the global average, a tungsten concentrate recovery rate of 85%, and a production comprehensive cost far lower than state-owned tungsten enterprises in China. The mine completed a $75.1 million project loan from the German KfW IPEX Bank in 2025 and is expected to be commissioned by the end of 2026. American Tungsten Corp. announced on October 27 that it will acquire the Gentung-Browns Lake project in Montana, USA. This move is supported by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) and is seeking a shareholding from the Department of Defense.

02 Seizing top-tier untapped resources becomes key to US comeback

01 Core Options for Global Alternative Supplies

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) does not include Kazakhstan as a major resource country for tungsten, due to the low level of exploration in the country, resulting in data gaps. Since 2018, Kazakhstan has issued 2,906 exploration permits and 111 production permits, but only a dozen or so locations are actively being explored. Kazakhstan itself estimates that its tungsten reserves (WO₃) exceed 2 million tons, and the related analysis from the Development Research Center of the China Geological Survey shows that its reserves account for about 20.7% of the global proportion, ranking second in the world. Although the country's overall tungsten reserves are large, nearly 87% of the tungsten reserves are tungsten-molybdenum deposits with generally low grades. The main deposits include:The Ust-Khakaljinzhenskoye Deposit(in Karaganda), which is the largest tungsten deposit in Kazakhstan, accounting for about 70% of the former Soviet Union's tungsten reserves, with WO₃ reserves of 1.216 million tons, an average grade of 0.132%, unmined, and associated molybdenum of 39,600 tons, and also has rare earth mineralization;The North Katapar Deposit(in Karaganda), with WO₃ reserves of about 1 million tons, an average grade of 0.13% - 0.15%, unmined;The Baku-Ta Tungsten Deposit(in Almaty), with WO₃ reserves of about 231,500 tons as of the end of 2024, an average grade of 0.211%; andThe Mirolyubovsky District in East Kazakhstan, with a predicted tungsten resource volume of 6,195 tons.

Of these, the Shchekaljin Gzhatskoye and North Karteminers ore deposits, which had been idle for decades after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, had a mining cycle of three to four decades. In April 2025, the government of Kazakhstan included the two major projects in its privatization plan, triggering the global bidding process.

Notably, the newly discovered Kuyrektykol deposit in Karaganda Oblast holds vast rare earth resources, with proven reserves of rare earth metals estimated at about 8 million tons, and reported latest reserves reaching 282 million tons. According to Bloomberg, if the data is confirmed, Kazakhstan's rare earth reserves would be second only to China and Brazil. At that time, the project would be led by the state mining company Tau-Ken Samruk of Kazakhstan and developed using a public-private partnership model.

02 The advantage of early development cooperation between China and Kazakhstan

The China-Kazakhstan tungsten industry cooperation, with the Baku-Tau tungsten mine project in Almaty Province as the core benchmark, is a model of capacity cooperation under the "Belt and Road" framework, covering multiple dimensions such as resource development, technology output, and capital operation. The project, led by Jiangxi Copper Group, officially started production in November 2024. The mine is the world's largest open-pit tungsten mine with a trioxide tungsten storage, and it plans to mine and process 3.3 million tons of tungsten ore in 2025. Subsequently, it is also planned to add an additional $150 million investment to build a deep processing complex to produce high-purity tungsten carbide. Many enterprises, such as China FiveMetals and China Railway Construction, participated in the construction, and through technological innovation, the beneficiation recovery rate was increased to 87.74%. Its mining cost is significantly lower than similar projects in China. In August 2025, Jiaxin International, in which Jiangxi Copper Group is the main shareholder, was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Astana International Exchange simultaneously. This is not only the first listed company in Hong Kong with tungsten mine development as its main business but also the first RMB-denominated stock in Central Asia, providing a capital operation model for subsequent cooperation.

The Chinese state-owned enterprises participating in this bidding, with Jiangxi Copper as the core, and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, which cooperates with it, had already invested $260 million in 2021 to build a mine in Kazakhstan, and is an important force for China's participation in the development of Kazakhstan's tungsten mines. In the tungsten mine project, Jiangxi Copper has already laid out Kazakhstan, and negotiations have lasted for many years and have made decisive progress. However, the unconventional intervention of the US government has led to the loss of mining rights by Jiangxi Copper at the last minute.

03 The United States' unconventional means "interception" action

Kazakhstan's tungsten and rare earth resources both have huge potential, and are a turn-round opportunity that the US has been eagerly awaiting. earlier this year, after being prompted by the US Department of Commerce, the US Wabtec company and the state railway company of Kazakhstan reached a $4.2 billion agreement to sell advanced locomotives, and the US investment company Cove Kaz Capital Group and the state geological survey company of Kazakhstan JSC Qazgeology established a joint venture to carry out rare earth projects in the Costanay region.

Faced with the upcoming deal between Chinese companies and the U.S. government, the U.S. government broke the rules of commercial negotiations and directly got involved in the resource grab. In September 2025, during a meeting between U.S. Commerce Secretary Raimondo and Kazakh President Tokayev, Trump personally called to communicate, elevating the transaction to a political level. Raimondo personally pushed for the establishment of a joint venture between Cove Kaz Capital Group and the Kazakh sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna to operate the mine, planning to process tungsten mines in Kazakhstan and export them to the U.S. after local processing, ensuring that the resources directly serve the defense and industrial needs of the U.S. On the one hand, the U.S. promised to help Kazakhstan achieve diversified mineral exports by offering market access and technical support; on the other hand, it exerted pressure through tariff threats, sending a letter that " trade arrangements will be subject to an additional 25% tariff" if not accepted, forcing Kazakhstan to lean towards the U.S. in the tungsten mine cooperation. The U.S. Export-Import Bank provided a letter of intent for $900 million in support, and private capital filled the $200 million gap, significantly enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. companies in the bidding process. In November 2025, during President Tokayev's visit to the U.S., the two sides signed a letter of intent and reached a joint venture agreement, forming a structure of "U.S. companies holding 70% and Kazakh state-owned enterprise Tau-Ken Samruk holding 30%", giving Cove Kaz Capital Group the right to operate the project and 70% of the production marketing rights.

03 Global supply chain restructuring and the chain reaction of the geopolitical pattern

This "cutting" incident reflects three deep-seated contradictions: First, the interest game between resource-rich and consumer countries under the imbalance of global tungsten resources supply and demand; second, the conflict between the traditional resource supply pattern and the emerging powers' demand for the security of the industrial chain; third, the power struggle between traditional influence and external forces' infiltration in the Central Asian geographical space. This marks the extension of the strategic competition between China and the United States from the fields of technology and trade to the field of core resources, forming a "resource-industrial chain-geography" tripartite competitive pattern. The series of actions by the United States to seize lithium in Latin America, cobalt in Africa, and tungsten in Central Asia are essentially attempts to reconstruct the global high-end manufacturing industry chain by controlling upstream resources and to curb the momentum of China's industrial upgrading. In the future, the competition between China and the United States in the field of key mineral resources will be more intense, and the competitive scope may expand to more rare metals and new energy mineral resources.

The "cutting" incident also highlights that the contemporary competition for resources has gone beyond the simple commercial logic, presenting characteristics of "politicalization" and "geopolitization". "Big power balance" has become a geopolitical tendency for resource-rich countries to cooperate with foreign partners, seeking to maximize benefits among major powers, leading to a more complex pattern of resource cooperation and a significant increase in regional geopolitical uncertainties. For enterprises, overseas resource layout needs to balance commercial interests with geopolitical security, constructing a combination strategy of "capital + technology + localization + geopolitical risk prevention and control"; for resource-rich countries, how to maintain autonomy and avoid being used as pawns in the game of major powers, achieving sustainable benefits from resource development, has become an important issue; for the world, there is an urgent need to establish fairer and more reasonable rules for the governance of resources, to avoid the competition for resources evolving into geopolitical confrontation, and to ensure the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

In the future, the competition for key global minerals will become more intense, and the restructuring of the industrial chain and the adjustment of the geopolitical pattern will form a development trend that is interwoven. China needs to learn from this, strengthen the prediction of geopolitical risks in the layout of overseas resources, optimize the "capital + technology + localization" cooperation model, and consolidate the advantages of the industrial chain; resource countries should adhere to independent decision-making and build a diversified and balanced cooperation system; the international community needs to promote the establishment of a fair and transparent resource governance mechanism to avoid the competition for resources evolving into a geopolitical conflict. Driven by the dual forces of great power politics and industrial transformation, the strategic value of core resources will continue to be highlighted, becoming a key variable affecting national competitiveness and the global pattern.

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